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A commentary on
From computers to cultivation: reconceptualising evolutionary psychology
by Barrett, L., Pollet, T., and Stulp, G. (2014). Front. Psychol. 5:867. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00867
Barrett et al. review recent developments in evolutionary psychology (EP) and conclude that
EP offers little in way of theoretical advancement over standard computational theory of mind
(CTM) accounts, because traditional approaches in psychology implicitly accept that cognition is
evolved. To Barrett et al., historical resistance to EP is surprising given that EP assumes the tradi-
tional computational-representational model of cognition. Across cognitive psychology, however,
evolutionary approaches are sometimes accepted, but often mostly ignored. Vision and auditory
perception researchers are typically functionalist, and as a result have made advances exceeding
other areas of cognitive science—these scholars are often friendly to EP at least in some form. But
many other areas have neither adopted a functionalist perspective nor currently accept the research
program of EP. Certainly, most researchers in cognitive psychology do not attempt to reverse engi-
neer computational solutions to adaptive problems as EP does. Not coincidentally, many cognitive
psychologists study what EP would consider nonfunctional by products.
Still, it is true that EP has largely embraced cognitive psychology (though actual cognitive
research is still surprisingly rare) and has integrated it with theories from evolutionary biology.
Barrett et al. suggest that the adoption of the CTM constitutes a weakness for EP and they instead
propose that various forms of e-cognition (i.e., embodied, embedded, enactive) offer a viable alter-
native to computational approaches. But as Klasios (2014) pointed out in his recent commentary,
Barrett et al. fail to recognize that “cognitive integration” is information processing, and in its most
basic sense, is necessarily computational. As Gallistel and King (2009) recently put it, describing
the mind as a case of digital computation “is the only game in town” (p. 24). There is no scientific
alternative to the notion that the neural coding of events in the world involves the probabilistic
transformation of information. If one admits that much, logical entailments prevent the kind of
rejection of the CTM that Barrett et al. endorse.
Notions of e-cognition can be provocative, and on the surface can seem like an advancement in
our ideas about human cognition. However, there are some fundamental problems in the current
presentation and the ideas in general. By suggesting that our cognition is shaped by cultural artifact
use, I believe Barrett et al. point the causal arrow mostly backwards. That is not to say that artifacts
cannot, in principle, affect brain organization, but the evidence to date seems to favor the idea that
cultural phenomena are generally tailored to our brains and bodies, not the reverse (Claidiere and
Sperber, 2007). For instance, the authors use the example of time-pieces contributing to culturally
Bryant Evolved computers with culture
evolved values associated with timeliness, and they attribute
timeliness as being part of our human nature, essentially arguing
that extended artifacts like time-pieces have altered our cultural
cognitive machinery. There is no question that inventions like
time-pieces feed back into practices and beliefs—the more we
advance the technology, the more we allow ourselves to be
manipulated by it. But timeliness is a byproduct of social coor-
dination, cooperation, and reciprocity. If an individual demands
that her associate pay attention to the time—an ability afforded
by a time-piece—and then the associate does not abide when able
to do so, he is implicitly discounting the value of the relationship.
The human nature component in this example is not the timeli-
ness per se, but the use of culturally evolved norms as a means to
coordinate social interactions.
Admittedly, the ways neural coding schemes relate to vari-
ous phenomena in the world, external to the brain itself, con-
stitute hard empirical questions that will almost certainly need
to incorporate many complexities suggested by various forms of
e-cognition. These issues will likely be resolved, however, within
a framework that involves, at its theoretical core, computational
mechanisms implemented in the brain. Even if some of the exter-
nal phenomena that e-cognition proponents describe constituted
legitimate examples of extended phenotypic traits (Dawkins,
1982), their implementation would still land squarely in the neu-
ral circuitry of the brain interfacing with motor systems. For
example, written language is learned by people quite effectively
and writing systems are shaped by both cultural and cognitive
factors, including visual processing and memory systems. There
is evidence of a brain area that, when given certain input, reliably
develops expertise for visual words (Dehaene, 2009), showing
amazing flexibility in how brain structure interacts with culture
(Barrett, 2012). But our understanding of the psychology of read-
ing is purely computational. Similarly, we don’t need a special
theory of beaver cognition because of beaver dams—we just need
to explain the evolved cognitive and behavioral processes that
allow beavers to build them.
Evolutionary behavioral scientists who study culture often rely
on the concept of domain generality, presumably because cul-
tural phenomena seemingly incorporate so many aspects of our
cognition and environment. Of course, culture is deeply inter-
connected with many facets of our cognitive processing, but
that does not require a system that is infinitely flexible and
unconstrained by past selection. Rather, culture is rooted in a
suite of cognitive and communicative abilities that allow us to
transmit rich information vertically and horizontally, and the
outputs of such processes feedback iteratively into an evolu-
tionarily dynamic cultural knowledge system rooted in adaptive
computational design. Cultural transmission often follows cer-
tain patterns resulting in stable psychological and communicative
strategies that have all the hallmarks of domain specificity: (i) our
attention is directed in specific ways to particular relevant agents,
(ii) motivational systems drive the spreading of specific kinds
of information, and iii) cultural learning systems are content
sensitive.
The authors acknowledge the idea that there is no defensi-
ble dividing line between domain specific and domain general
mechanisms (Barrett and Kurzban, 2006), but then they fail to
properly appreciate this in their treatment of certain culturally
learned information, such as the special status of incest taboos
in cultural transmission. In the example given, Barrett et al.
fail to acknowledge the possibility that unconscious processes
guiding incest avoidance (Lieberman et al., 2007) were driv-
ing the mating decisions described by Durham (2002) despite
variations over time in the local cultural rules. Overall, they
emphasize examples of domain-general mechanisms potentially
solving problems that some evolutionary psychologists consider
onlymanageable by highly specialized domain-specific systems—
but seem to momentarily forget that just because a mechanism
works across content domains, it is still functionally special-
ized. The scope of a mechanism is independent from whether it
has design features (i.e., functional specialization) (Barrett and
Kurzban, 2006). Cognitive mechanisms, including associative
learning processes and various decision making systems sensi-
tive to local information, can operate on representations across
multiple domains and subsequently feed into more specialized
systems—cognition is hierarchically structured, and evolutionar-
ily conserved (Barrett, 2012). So where is the argument exactly?
Despite these disagreements—some apparent, some real—
Barrett et al. seem to illustrate that the historical gap between
behavioral ecology and evolutionary psychology is closing, not
widening. Many evolutionary psychologists are developing a
greater appreciation for cultural evolution and behavioral flex-
ibility, and behavioral ecologists are more concerned now with
cognitive adaptations and experimental psychology methodol-
ogy. Both fields have led the behavioral sciences in cross-cultural
fieldwork, and to a great extent, we share a theoretical founda-
tion. Don Symons’s question (1987) still looms, however: If we’re
all Darwinians, what’s the fuss about?
References
Barrett, H. C. (2012). A hierarchical model of the evolution of human brain
specializations. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 109(Suppl. 1), 10733–10740. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1201898109
Barrett, H. C., and Kurzban, R. (2006). Modularity in cognition: framing the
debate. Psychol. Rev. 113, 628–647. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.113.3.628
Claidiere, N., and Sperber, D. (2007). The role of attraction in cultural evolution.
J. Cogn. Cult. 7, 89–111. doi: 10.1163/156853707X171829
Dawkins, R. (1982). The Extended Phenotype. Oxford: WH Freeman.
Dehaene, S. (2009). Reading in the Brain. New York, NY: Viking.
Durham, W. H. (2002). “Cultural variation in time and space: the case for a popu-
lational theory of culture,” in Anthropology Beyond Culture, eds R. G. Fox and
B. J. King (Oxford: Berg), 193–206.
Gallistel, C. R., and King, A. P. (2009). “Information,” in Memory and the Com-
putational Brain: Why Cognitive Science Will Transform Neuroscience (Oxford:
Wiley-Blackwell). doi: 10.1002/9781444310498.ch1
Klasios, J. (2014). Our computational nature: comment on Barrett et al. Front.
Psychol. 5:1348. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01348
Lieberman, D., Tooby, J., and Cosmides, L. (2007). The architecture
of human kin detection. Nature 445, 727–731. doi: 10.1038/nature
05510
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 498
Bryant Evolved computers with culture
Symons, D. (1987). “If we’re all Darwinians, what’s the fuss about?” in Sociobiology
and Psychology, eds C. B. Crawford, M. F. Smith, and D. L. Krebs (Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum), 121–146.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Bryant. This is an open-access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, dis-
tribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the origi-
nal author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in
this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 498
